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CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHERS DISCUSSED
The question of free will has been called by Herr Du Bois'4"',

Reymond, a modern materialist and evolutionist, a riddle which
ill ever remain insol~ble.l

Science, he felt, had no answer for

.

However, he recognized the indisputable fact of free will •
nlike Du Bois-Reymond there are many later evolutionists who
avoid the riddle by denying free will, or by proposing an evasive
solution which in name maintains freedom bJlt in fact is only a
80ft determinism.
From among these evolutionary philosopher. we have selected three for discussion in this thesis, Engels, Ward and Sellars
ederick Engels is one of those who dismisses the problem by
denying free will.

James Ward proposes a teleological view which

...

lapses into a soft determinism.

Roy Wood Sellars finds no place

in his naturalistic universe for any traditional view of free
ill.

ENGELS
Frederick Engels, co-founder of Modern Communism and there
ere important in modern times, presents a strictly materialistic
concepti&n of all being. 2 Far him matter is the only reality,
and in terms of matter and its motion the world and all that is
in it are to be explained.

Engels plainly regards his philosophy

as strictly materialistic and accepts the name that Marx has

~----------------------------------6~.
it, Dialectic Materialism. In presenting the doctrine ot
glven
.. '
thiS Communist 8pokesman we are using his work "Herr Eugen Dur'hing's Revolution in Science", which is a refutation ot Durhing's
philOSOphy and at the same time a systematic exposition of the
dlalectc method and of the Communist

w~;ld

outlook.

Also, we

will cull from his later work "Ludwig Feuerbach", which is a criticism not only of the works of Feuerbach but also of the classioal German Philosophy.
WARD
The philosophy of James Ward, a Cambridge

psycholog~t

and

.etaphysician of distinction, is set forth in his Gifford Lectures published under the title, "The Realm
and Theism".3

or

Ends, or Pluralism

The work presents a criticism of pluralism in

tavor of a theistic interpretation of the wbrld.

Ward sets forth

an 1dealistic philosophy which, to his mind, is grounded on the
realities of human experience and the sifted findings of the
Bc1ences of nature.

•

Departing from the old absolute idealism and

accepting the panpsychist monadology of Leibnitz, Ward takes as
his

st~rting

point the pluralistic outlook; his preference then

is for the many rather than the one.

In like manner he rejects

the a priori method of the older idealists and through the study
of effects proceeds to the causes.

The picture of reality thus

presented is completed with the theistic view of the truth of a
transcendent-immanent God, who is the beginning, becoming and end
of the many.

Ward maintains that such a view is the only one

that can give a satisfactory meaning to what we know of the world

7.

.'

It is rationally justified though it be not empirically verified;
that is, strictly speaking, it is an act of faith.

.

The article

"Psychology" in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica of which he is the author will also assist much in the
presentat10n of his doctrine.
SELLARS

Roy Wood Sellars, at present a professor at Michigan Uni..
versity, calls his philosophy Evolutionary
Naturalism. 4 It is a
modified form of Emergent Evolution as proposed by Lloyd Morgan.
For the emergents, evolution is a progressive series of stages of
being in which there supervenes at each new level a new form of
relatedness to ascending levels. 5 Activity or mind equ~ted with
God is said by Morgan to be the agency which lifts the world. .
Sellars accepts the general theory of emergent development but
rejects the
quired.

n~tion

of God.

Nature is the onl¥ explanation re-

Hence, the title, Evolutionary Naturalism.

Sellars de.

fines it as an outlook or attitude toward reality rather than as
a fixed and dogmatic set of principles.

This naturalism, however

is necessarily materialistic for nature is regarded as a complete
and closed system functioning essentially upon the genetic basis
of the physical world and needing no power or being outside of
this system.

The presentation of Evolutionary Naturalism is to

be found in a book by Sellars bearing that title.

Together with

that volume another book by Sellars, «The Principles and Problems
of Philosophy" has been used as the source from which the presentation of Sellar's philosoPhy has been drawn.

I

8.

In this thesis the dootrines of these three will be proposed in three separate chapters with a view to understanding
clearly just ehat each one holds concerning free will.

Thus far

the treatment will be merely expository and analytic.

A similar

presentation of the traditional

Schola~pic

the writings of its leaders will be given.

doctrine as found in
The evolutionary doc-

trines will be evaluated then in the light of the Scholastic doctrine and their errors and inadequacies·pointed out.

9.
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Notes to ChaEter I
1.

This view was expressed in a leoture before the Berlin
Aoademy of ~oienoes on July 8, 1880.

2.

Engels, 1820 - 1895, was the most intimate friend and inseparable oompanionof Marx. Together they pu~lished a number of books and artioles on Sooialism. Their inflammatory
artioles against absolutism oaused their expulsion from
Franoe. Brussels saw the publioa£ton of the handbook of
Communism, Manifesto of the Communist Party. This manifesto
drawn up at the request of the Communist Union, oontains the
germ of all the leading ideas developed by Marx later on.

3.

Ward, 1843 - 1925, originally studied for the ministry and
was minister of Emmanual Churoh, Cambridge for one year.
La~er he devoted himself to psyohologioal researoh, beoame
fellow of Trinity College in 1875 and university professor
of mental ph1lGsophy in 1897. He was Gifford leoturer at
Aberdeen 1895 - 97 and at st. Andrew's in 1908 - 10. Besides the Realmsof Ends other 1mportant works touohing our
subjeot are Naturalism and Agnost1cism, Psyohological Prinoiples, and numerous artioles 1n Mind and in the Br1t1sh
Journal of Psychology.

4.

Roy Wood Sellars is a member of the new school known as
Cr1tioal Reali.m, Thi. new school resembles olosely the
sohool of Engl1sh New Real1sm. Sellars was one of the contr1butors to the volume, Essays 1n Critical Realism.

5.

O. Lloyd Morgan,

Emergent Evolution,

p. 35.

10.
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CHAPTER II
ENGELS AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Dialectical Materialism is the title given by Karl Marx to
the system of philosophy on which the Communistic revolution is
~

based.

In defining the two terms Marx said that the dialectic is

the theory of the changes, conflicts and resolutions which we observe and which men in the past have obierved going on in the wo
world.

The meaning of materialism is clear for it simply means

that all reality is explained solely in terms of matter to the
exclusion of every immaterial being and concept.
Marx calls his philosophy inverted Hegelianism.
to have set the philosophy of Hegel on its feet.
came about in the following manner.

He claims

The inversion

Hegel maintained that real-

ity is the working out of the Absolute in the process of theSiS,
antithesis and synthesis.

In this way the Absolute.as present·

in the driving force behind the developing world.

Marx main-

tained that there was only the world present and this world was
developing into the Absolute. Engels states the position thus:
, "Hegel's dialectics is selfdevelpment of the concept.
The absolute concept does not only exsist - where unknown - from eternity, it is alao the actual living
soul of the whole exsisting world. This ideological
reversal had to be dane away with. We comprehended
the concepts in our heads once more materialistically
as images of real things instead of regarding the real
things as images of this or £.hat stage or development
or the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science or the general laws of motion both of external world and of human thought.- two sets
of laws which are identical in subatance but differ in
their expression in so far aa the human mind can apply
them consciously, while in nature and also up to now

11~

for the most part in human history, these laws aS8'ert
themselves unconscioualy in the forms of external necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming
accidents. Thereby the dialectic of the concept itself becp-me merely the conscious reflex of the dialextical motion of the real world and the dialectic of
Hegel was placed upon its head, or rather turned off
its head on waieh it waB stand~~g before, and placed
upon its feet again. ---- The great basic thought
that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-mad things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no-less than their images in our he~ds, the concepts,
go through an uninterrupted chante of coming into
being and passing away, in which, in spite of all
seeming accidents and of all temporary retrogeession,
a progressive development asserts itself' in the end this fundamental thought has, expecially since the
time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated consciousness
that in this generality it is scarcely ever contradicted." 1.
Reality viewed from this standpoint demands no final s01utions and eternal truths.
tive terms.

For true

~nd

false become only rela-

Motion is at the bottom of everything, and only when

acknowledging this motion can we view reality as it is.

.Because

of this continuous tide of change all constancy in nature, and
therefore every basis for absolute metaphysics, is destroyed.

By

thus inverting the Hegelian process, the materialists attempted
l

to make matter in motion the sole basis of all reality.

All

notions of spiritual forces were rejected as unnecessary, as
having no foundation in reality.
Communist Way to Freedom
The history of the world shows us that the path of this
development will be revolutionary, but in the end will lead to
a perfect Communistic world in whieh all class. distinctions have

12.

een eradicated and the forces of production are controlled by
and not by the capitalist.

Under such conditions the

will be relieved of all anxiety over the means of subistence.

In this state there can be, for the first time, mean-

ng in our talk of real human freedom aad of an exsistence in har
with the established laws of nature. 2
The only freedom considered by Engels is this external

•

reedom which is nothing more than economic freedom based on comity of ownership.

This mignt also be taken as his definition

freedom.
Is man a free agent in bringing himself to this millenium
freedom?

Marx who is of one mind with Engels would say no.

his 'Critique of Political Economy' we find a fUller answer.
e says:
"It is not the consoious mind or man that determines the
form or-nis being, but, vice versa, the social form of
his being that determines the conscious action of his
•
mind. "
hus the nature and content of the Capitalist consciousness is
quite different from that of labor.

The material conditions of

each class are the determinanats of both their physical and mental action.

And as the material condit1ons of each class d1ffer,

so the determinants. of their phvsical and mental action d1ffer.
us there 1s one set of pr1nciples and ends for the capitalist,
another for the laborer; exploitation of the laborer dictated by
greed and lust for power, for the first; hatred of the capitalist
and the overthrow

or

the system by revolution, for the second.

13.

These principles and ends, we note once more, are not the' result
of the choice of the individuals making up the classes but are
the necessary result of the laws of nature working themselves out
under the peculiar economic conditions of the present stage of
the world's development.

The individual is not a free being but

merely a cell in the organism ot his own class.

.

Thus the environ

ment in which the cell finds itself determines its actions; and
,

'

while the individual may seem to act freely, yet his actions are
determined from within by inner-connections peculiar to the class
and unknown to him. 3
Necessity in the Class
In like manner the class itself is pictured as being determined by these two factors, 1) the laws of nature operating
the same way thDoughout the whole of nature, and 2) the peculiar
economic conditions surrounding the class.

Engels considers thdt

this is a valid conclUsion from the history of the world up to
his day.

For the diversity of philosophies, religions, customs,

codes of law and the other fruits of men's theorizing reflect the
world's development in the minds of men.

And the diversity is

due to ignorance of the real inter-connections beneath the process of development and the supplying of other inter-connections
in their place.

4

These various inter,retatlons,ot phenomena con-

tain a grain ot truth but, die to 19norance, are for the most
part false.

Just what the grain of truth is which is to be found

in these systems, Engels does not say.

However, from his dis-

I

14.

cuss ion of the question of morality we might conclude th4't those
elements of the different philosophies which SUppOl't the rise of
the proletabiat contain this grain of truth.
Economic Conditions Determine Morality
From the fact that the different classes of society have
their special morality Engels concludes that men consciously or
nconsciously derive their moral ideas trom the practical relations on which their class position is based; in other words
their morality is a system based on the economic relations in
which they carryon productionaand exchange. 5 To the obJection
that there is much in common between the codes of morality of the
capitalist class and laboring class Engels responds that the common element in these codes is due 'solely to the fact that these
different classes represent stages of the same historical development having a common historical background.

6

Not one of

thes~

codes is the true one in the sense that it has absolute validity_
That morality which, in the present, represents the overthrow of
the present, represents the future, and contains the maximum of
durable elements.

And that morality is the proletariat.

7

The

good life, consequently, is the one in which the individual, acting in accordance with the laws of nature, helps to promote the
process of historical evolution.

And since this process means

the rise of the prolebariat and the destruction of the capitalist
class, the furthering of the cause of the proletariat becomes a
sort of norm of morality.

15 •

Forces of Historical Development

.
'

In speaking of these various driving forces behind the fo
ward moveaent of the world Engels acclaims these three great discoveries which present a starting pOint, for the demonstration of
the interconnection between the processes in nature in particular
spheres as well as between these various spheres themselves.

The

first is the discovery of the cell as tA unit from Whose multiplication and differentiation the whole organism of plant and
animal body develops.

This relation is applied to the individual

in saying that the relation of the individual to the c18,ss is the
same as that of the cell to the organism.

The second discovery

is the transformation of energy which has demonstrated that all
the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic
matter are different forms of manifestation of universal motion.
This is a justification of materialism.

The third is the dis- ,,.

coyery of narwin that the stock of organic products of nature
surrounding us today, including mankind, is the result of a long'
process of evolution from a tew original unicellular germs.

With

the aid of these discoveries it is possible to present in an approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the interconnections in nature by means of the facts provided by empirical
nature 1tself. 8
Engels, following Hegel, now indicates the forces which in
the present economic conditions are behind the process of world
development.

The motive force of historical development presents

I

16.

itself in the form of evil, each new advance necessarily-'appear,.
ing as a sacrilege against things hallowed, as a rebellion
age,inst conditions which, however old and morib\md, have still
been sanctified by custom.

Since the emergence of class distinc-

tions it has been precisely the wicked 'passions of man - greed
and lust for pwoer - which serve as the levers of historical development.

..

The history of feudalism and of the bourgeosie is a

single proof.

9

Engels does not stop with the ganeralization given above
but goes further and show. in just what the good life consists.
The utge to happiness is innate in man and therefore must farm
the basis of all morals.

Happiness, then, is the end to be sough.

in life, and what makes me happy is good, unhappy, evil.

~~e

basic laws of Feuerbach's morality, rational self-restraint with
regard to ourselves end love in out intercourse with others are
rejected by Engels as tenuous and superficial.

Preoccupation

with the outside world rather than Vii th ourselves is the way to
happiness.

The urge to happiness thrives only to a trivial ex-

tent on ideal rights.

The material means to happiness are by far

the greater source of this happiness. Engels gives some of these
means; - "Means of subsistence, an individual of the opposite sex
books, conversation, argument, activities, articles for use and
working up". 10
The morality of Feuerbach based on mutual love and consideration is rejected for the second reason that it is cut ex-

17.
.
11
aotly to the pattern of modern capitalistic society.

~tua1

love?

The~e

oan be no love between the oapitalist and the labor-

er for

~hetr

classes are opposed to one another.

Furthermore,

greed and lust for power are the levers of historical development
'4'",

under presnedt conditions; and in order to fubther this process
and thus

p~omote

the cause of the proletariat we

course whieh these evil passions

dictate~

~

follow the

Engels acknowledges

the presenee of ecil and seems to regret it for he says that the
present evtl

will bring about the future good. And that future

good, as has already been mentioned, is the elfmination of all
classes from society, and the placing of the productive powers in
the hands of the people.

The f1nal resutl will be the poss1bil-

ity of leading one's life in accord with so-called established
laws of nature.

Such a life of eoonomic freedom is the only free

life.
What we have seen so far makes up the general setting in
which the indiv1dual is placed.

Man

finds himself in a olosed

system of whiCh he 1s a very insignificant part.

Just as the

life of the brute and every inanimate oreature is beyond doubt
neoessitated in every respeot by the laws of nature, so is the
life of each human being.

Human nature is

dist1ngui~ed

from the

others by this one feature that its conformity is not blind but
consoious and intelligent.

In this conscious conformity to the

laws of evolving history, and in it alone, oonsists man's freedom, as we shall now prooeed to show in Engel's own words.

18.

"To him ( Hegel ) freedom is the appreciation of 4 necessity. 'Necessity is blind only in so far as it is
not understood'. Freedom does not consist in the
dream of independence of natural law~, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives
of systematically making them work towards definite
ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of
external nature and to those w~ch govern the bodily
and mental life of men themselves - two classes of
laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality. Freedom of the will
therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the sUbject. Therefore
the freer a man's judgment is i~ relation to a def.1nite question, with so much the greater necessity is
the content of this judgment determined; while the
uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to
make an arbitrary choice among many different and
conflicting possibilities, shows by this precisely
that it is not free, that it is controlled by the
. very object that it should control itself. Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves
and over external nature which is founded on knowledge
of natural necessity; it is therefore a product of historical development." 12.
Internal Freedom
The question of internal freedom apparently never
the mind of Engels.

entere~

Of course were he to consider it his opin-

ion would be that such a power was incompatible with the materialistic explanation of human nature which the Communist maintains.

Human nature and human behavior will some day be complete

ly explained in terms of scientif1c laws.
knowledge of these laws does

no~

At present our l1mited

permit of such an explanat10n.

All that we can say 'at present is that the will 1s determined by
deliberat10n and passion. l3 Man w1lls what he does, but his will
is governed and controlled by the laws of his nature.
According to this view, then, the object of the will is

19.

the economic good.
means to life.

For the individual it means the

mate~ial

And this good is ordained for a still higher

good, the economic independence of the human race, the goal of
Communism.
In the mind of
tain of attainment.
progresses.

~gels

'4"",

the goal is quite definite and cer-

It is the end towards whiCh the human race

.

Engels attempts to acoountfor the apparent freedom

in human actions by saying that ignorance of men retards the progress of the race.

However, this ignorance does not and cannot

change the course of th1s progress.

For the same reason of ex-

plaining away human, freedom he says that man's influence at times
seems to effect what seem to be fortuitous events.

Similarly,

men do not succeed in fulfilling their intentions.

The results

of their actions either fall short of or exceed the desired end.
However, under all of these events there work inexorably, to the
.+

final end, the inner hidden laws which govern and control all
events.
SUmriJarl
Free will, then, has no place in the Communist outlook.
Man is a cog in the class machine, nothing more, nothing less.
The forces of historical development which move and determine the
class are the ultimate springs and determinants of individual
human activity.

The ends and aims of the class are the enly ends

and aims of the individual whether he know it or not.

The indi-

vidual is inSignificant, the class is the all-important thing in

20.

history and life.

It is therefore an illusion to say

free, either as a person or as a member of

socie~y.

th~t

man i8

His efforts,

consciously posited, are actually functions of the unknown innerprocesses which he unwittingly serves.

His freedom does not can,
slst in personal autonomy, freedom of selfdetermination, but
......

rather in the power to know the inner laws which govern him and
to act in accordance with them.

His frjedom is economic liberty.

a.nd the glory of man is t·o help the cause of the world revolution
and make possible the real freedom of those happy individuals who
shall witness its triumph.

21 •
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OHAPTER III
WARD AND PANPSYOHISM

Our first exposition dealt with Dialectic Materialism
which, as we saw, denied the existence '.,of free will.
materialistic philosophy we now turn to James Ward's

From this
panp~ychis

tic interpretation of reality in which we shall find the author's
answer to

Du

BOis-Reymond's great riddll.

"All individual things are anumated, albei t in diver.se degrees.

Everything has in itself a striving to preserve its own

condition and improve itself.tt

These are the words of Spinoza

and they are accepted by Ward as fundamentally correct, though
primitive •. Such a view is fundamental because it takes account
of both factors of experience and because, while it is impossible
from the standpoint of nature to reach spirit, it is only from
the standpoint of spirit that nature can be under.tood: in a word
the universe is taken to be spiritual - a realm of ends.
From this standpoint Ward interpretes the 8onstitution of
the world strictly in terms of mind.

I

Every existent being has a

oumenal side and phenomenal side, a body and a soul.

Through

the process of creative enolution or 'epigenesis' the lowest
eing has gradually developed from stage to stage until the highest being, man, was attained.

The lowest being, in striving afte

ends, gradually developed through conflict and cooperation with
other beings.

At' the human level, man, by communicating with

other human beings, achieves his own creative synthesis in the

I

23.

characteristic qualities of self-consciousness ano. ratio~ality.2
In this highest creature we find the striving for ends ever going
on until the perfection of the realm of ends will be attained.
This ideal term of the creative series is that perfect harmony
.....

"in the consummation of a perl'ect commonwealth, wherein all cooperate and none conflict, wherein the many have become one, one
realm of ends.,,3

•

Moreover, this perfection of the human race is identified
with God who is rear4ed as the beginning, becoming and end of
this perfect harmony.

4

God is not a being remaining aloof from

the world and creatures but is with these creatures, immanently
present in the advance toward the creative synthesis.

God's re-

lation to creatures is not to be compared to that of the potter
to the clay but rather to the begetting of life by life.

This is

a brief sketch of the realm of ends and will suffice as a background for our study of Ward's doctrine on human freedom
Freedom in the Universe
Ward finds room in his universe for freedom and presents
arguments in its defence; but it is noteworthy that he does not
limit freedom to conscious beings only.

Unlike Engels, who main-

tains that all creatures are determined by the

~aws

of nature,

Ward maintains that there is freedom even in the lowest forms of
being.

The spontanebus action of these beings is not determined

by laws but rather by the ends which are the object of their
~triving.

The soul, or the entelechy of the body, is not limited
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to definite functions, but is capable of almost

limitles~'variety

The end pursued prompts the function, and the function in turn
develops and determines the structure.

In maying this Ward at-

tempts to explain specific activities in terms of final and ef..,
ficient causes only and thus would do away with anything like a
determining form innate in the being.

In this way the genesis of

the

.

range of beings is explained •

higbe~

Ward presents his exposition of free will by means of contrast.

In the first place, he contrasts self-determination with

echanical determination, efficient and final causation with
echanical uniformity, the historcal viewpoint with that of
science - in a word, 'the realm of ends' with 'the realm of
nature'.

In the second place, in truly Kanbian fashion, he con-

trasts the noumenal with the phenomenal, and distinguishes the
standpoint of the subject from that of the object.
First contrast
Determination, Ward points out, does not always mean the
same thing.

The traveler, to use his own example, is determined

to continue his journey though the wind be strong and the way
dusty.

Also, the dust is determined to its movement by the wind.
"In the first case determination implies efficient
causation, self-determination and purpose; it
does not imply any uniformity such that in all
like circumstances a like determination has always
occurred and always will. In the second case on
the other hand this is preCisely what is implied;
whereas nothing is implies as to efficient causation; also self-determination and purpose are
either denied or treated as meaningless." 5

I
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Mechanical causation, devoid of purpose and efficiency, tctgether
with the necessity that follows frOm it are onl]a methodological
postulate set down by the scientists.

They are unjustifi ed in

making this postulate a tested statement of th~mndamental
.,
nature of the universe and in attempting on thilground to prove

..

the unreality of eff1 cient and purposive

cauS8. tion.

.

In the same way the term 'direction' 1s fmbiguous and
needs to be

c~ar1fied.

Direotion in the physicelworld is purely

spatial and is absolutely determinate;

directio~1n

the human

realm, on the other hand, represents oontrol, guidance and a re-'
lation of wills.

Science presents us wi th a rellllll of meohanioal

neoessi tyj void of individuality, novelty, Cl'ea.tion and guidance.
History, on the other hand, is a report of i:nd11'idual initiative
and of the occurrence, through freedom, of new dievements and
conquests.
Rebuttal to Determinism
To the determinists', claim that the

SflJDe

aetermination is

found in both orders, motives moving the will a.sphysioal foroes
move a body, Ward answers.
"Forces, though distinct, combine theil'effeots
only because they converge on one bOdy;motives,
though distinct, confliot only becau.se they diverge, so to say, from one subjeot. Tbeforces,
that is, are applied to the body, the rDOt1ves
spring from the subj ect. The body JnovE911n the
one path whlch the forces collectively aetermine,
the subject moves in the one path wh1c1:l1t seleotively determines. The magnitude of tneforoe is
referred to an objective standard", thE9strength
of a motive depends on its subjecti'9'e ~orth; the
suffioient reason is in the one case mechanioal
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in the other it is teleological."

.'

6

Relation of Motives to Choice
With regard to the relation of motives to choice, Ward
believes that both indeterminists and qeterminists
make the mis..,
take of thinking of motives apart from the self.

Hence the in-

determinist sometimes feels compeiled to assert that the self
decides without a motive - an assertion-flagrantly untrue to experience - while the determinist declares that the action of the
self in necessarily determined by the strongest motive and is
therefore not free.

The truth is that the self does decide in

the direction of the strongest

~otive.

wise involves a denial of freedom.

l~is,

however, in no

As Ward conceives it, the

determination of the self by its nature is identical with selfdetermination, since the nature is one with the self.7 ~urthermore, such

dete~nation

does not imply the necessity of any

...

single act at a given time, for the self is never so fixed and
limited in its nature that only one act is possible.

Thus, the

self may be said to determine its act, yet man is also free
since determination and causation do not, in the human realm,
imply either necessity or uniformity.

The distinction, then,

between freedom and necessity becomes the difference between
variety in the individual's activity, on the one hand, and uniformity, on the other.
The following excerpt from his work will make clearer
Ward's understanding of motives.
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"Appetite and aversion, that is to say, conation~
implies something that seeks and shuns, a subject
that actively strives according as it feels and as
long as it lives. Psychologists do not ordinarily
talk of motives save in connection with deliberation, which in strictness is an intellectual
rather than a conative preocess; but for the purpose of our present discussion it wil~ be convenient, and need not mislead, if we regard movtives
not as pleas or reasons for acting but as impulses
or tendencies to action. So· regarded, their characteristic is not, that like external forces they move
or tend to move the subj ec t, but that they are themselves the subject moving or ten6ing to move, or
more accurately, acting or tending to act." 8
Second contrast
In the seoond contrast, using Lotze's figure of a tapestry as an illustration, Ward shows the relation of the phenomenal order to the noumenal. 9 The laws of causation of the scientist apply only to relations within the phenomenal order, but
cannot describe the relation between the phenomenal order and
the noumenal order.

Being independent of the phenomenal order,'

noumenal causation is not necessitated by it and is therefore
free.

This Kantian explanation is germane to our discussion in

the application of the subject-object concept to human persons.
Since the noumenal self is independent of the phenomenal order,
it is in that self that we are to look for freedom.

And this

freedom consists in the spontaneous, contingent response' capable
of novelty.

However, in any particular act there is a relation

between the two selves which has a determining influence on the
so-called free act.

But before going into the question of inter

nal freedom it will be well to consider Ward's analysis of the
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free act as opposed to the necessary actoof the scientidt and
the

determin~t.

Analysis of Internal Actions
We do not experience the volition within us as being
caused by something other than ouraelves.

If pleasurEI and pain

are verily subjective feeling or affection ( effects ), conation
is verily subjective activity or effectuation ( cause).

A mo-

tive implies both; and feeling and activity, though distinct,
may both arise together in certain situation.

But not even the

feeling, still less the conation, can be described as caused by
the situation, for the peculiar character which the sj'tuation
has is a quality given it by the subject.

The subjec1, unlike

inanimate things, is not indifferent to circumstances, but has
ends and aims to reali:r;,e; and therefore the subj ect af SUIDeS a
different attitude towards its environment according

this

liS

helps or hinders it in the pursuit of various purposef, which
conform to no general law save to that of self-conser",'ation and
betterment.

The subject's own character determines

charac-

tr.~e

ter it gives to objects, and its beha.vior towards thetll is so far
10
essentially self-determination.
To sum all this up in a few words, pleasure, pliLin and conation, viewed as such, are immanent activities of

thE~

subject,

are the subject's response and not the result of some external
for ce which produces these modifications in the

subjec~t.

In

this analysis the question of subjective activity indElpendent of

external causes has been

cons~dered.

The further questien of in-

ternal freedom will now be considered.
The "Realm of Ends", whose contents we have up to now been
considering, is a metaphysical consideration of the problems

-,

treated and says nothing of the question of internal freedom.
Ward does, however, give one section to the question of internal

..

freedom in his article, "Psychology", in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica, and it will serve our purpose to quote that sectiOn as he
gives it.
statement of the Question
t'The mention of deliberation brings us to the perenial problem of 'the freedom of the will'. But
to talk of will is to lapse into the confusions of
the old faculty-psychology. As locke long ago
urged; 'The question is not proper whether the
will be free, but whether a man be free.' In the
absence of restraint from without, when a man does
what he likes, we say he is'externally free'; but
he may still be the slave of every momentary impulse, and then it is said that he is not 'internally' free. The existence and nature of this internal freedom is the problem.
Analysis of Freedom
But if such freedom is held to imply a certain
sovereignty or autonom, of self over against momentary 'prepensions and blind desires, there can
obviously be no question of its existence till
the level of self-consciousness is reached and
maxims or principles of action are possible. The
young cilild, the brute and the imbecile, even
when they do as the like, have not this freedom,
though they may be said to act spontaneously. A
resolutely virtuous man will have more of this
freedom than the man of good moral disposition
who often succumbs to temptation; but it, is equally true that the hardened sinner has more of it
than one still deterred in his evil way by scrupees
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ot conscience. A man is internall~ tree, then, 4
whenever the ends he pursues have ~s wholehearted approval, whether he say with Milton's
Satan, 'Evil be thou my good', or with Jesus,
'Thy will be dane'. But this treedom is always
within our experience a relative treedom: hence
at a later time we otten declare that in some
past act ot choice we were not ourselves, not
really tree. But what is this true selt more
than our ideal? Or perhaps we preter to say'.
that we were tree and could have acted otherwise; and no doubt we might, it the place ot the
purely to~mal and abstract concept or selt had
been occupied by some other puaAe of that empirical selt which Is contInuously but at no one
moment· completely presented. It must be admitted, then, that ~ychological analysis in this
case is not only actually impertect, but must
always remain so - so long, am any rate, as all
that we discern by reflection is less tha all
we are. But this admission does not commit us
to allowing the possible existence of a liberum
arbitrium indifferentiae, sometimes called 'absolute indeterminIsm f ; for that would seem to
differ in no respect from absolute chance or
caprice."
Internal freedom, therefore, is nothing more than the absence ot
inhibition and internal conflict.

The essential note of this

freedom, then, is self-determination independent of external
force and internal restraint.

The peculiar disposition of the

individual is the actual determinant of the act.

The variability

of conduct, consequently, is never attributed to the will but is
said to lie in the mutability of the various forces within the
individual Which at any given moment determine the peculiar disposition of the subject.

Furthermore, the power of free will is

actually denied in Ward's rejection of a 'liberum arbitrium indifferentiae' •
Ward now takes up the discussion of the rigidly determin-
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istic position.
4
"On the other hand, the rigidly deterministic
position can only be psychologically justified
by ignoring the activity of the experiencing subjict altogether. At bottom it treats the analys s of conduct as if it were a dynamical problem
pure and simple. But motives are never merely so
many quantitative forces playing upon something
inert, or interacting entirely by themselves. At
the level of self-consciousness especially motives
are reasons and reason itself is a motive. In the
blind struggle of so-called' self'-regarding' impulses might is the only right; but in the light of
principles or practical maxims ~ight is the only
right. This superiority in position of principles
is only explicable by re~erence to the inhibitory
power of attention which alone makes deliberation
poss1ble and 1s essentiall~ voluntary; that is,
subjectively determined.ut no, 1t may be obje~
ted, deliberation in SUch cases is just the result
of painful experiences of the evil of hasty action,
and only ensues when this motive is strong enough
to restrain the impulse that would otherwise prevail. Even if this be granted, it does not prove
that subject's action is determined for and not
by him; it merely states the obvious tact that
prudence and self-control are gradually acquired.
Authoritative princIples ot action, such as seltlove and conscience, are no more psychologically
on a par with appetites and desires than thought
and reason are on a par with the association of
ideas." 11.
Thus Ward refutes rigid determinism by asserting the 1ntervention
of the self in human acts.

Unfortunately, he does no more than

assert that attention, principles of action and conscience influence these acts.

Nothing is said of the nature of the power in

virtue of which the individual is able to control attention, on
the one hand, and to follow the guidance of principles and conscience,on the other.

Furthermore, 'voluntary', to his m1nd, is

adequately defined in the term 'self-determination' as opposed
to determination from without.
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Summary
The external freedom which Ward maintains consists in the
subjeot·s spontaneity in responding to, or Bather following, motives.

The motives, then, do determine the course of aotion, and

are nothing more than the individual's evaluation of the objeot.
And sinoe this subjeotive evaluation does
. not oonst1tute a oonstant element, but is always ohanging', the response whioh it effeots also ohanges.

In other words, the variability of our sub-

jeotive state is made to aocount for the notable differenoe in
our oonduot when we are placed in the same objeotive situations.
In saying this, Ward avoids the problem of variability, a stumbling-block to determinists.

In the same way the feeling that we

could have acted differently on some given oocasion is explained,
not by our internal freedom, but by our different way of nowregarding the situation.

While rejeoting meohanioal determinism,

Ward falls into a form of psyohologioal determinism, for aooording to his view we oan, from experienoe, conclude only to external freedom.
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CHAPTER IV
SELLARS AND EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM

Dialeotio Materialism and Panpsyohism have given us two
answers to Du BOis-Reymond's riddle.
will give us a third answer.

E.yolutionary Naturalism

The interpretation of reality pro-

posed by Sellars is distinguished from Dialeotic Materialism and
Panpsyohism by its rejeotion of both materialism and vitalism as
fundamental tenets.

Another noteworthy characteristic is the ex-

plicit anti-thelogical and anti-religious bias which, at the
hands of Sellars, beoomes a vital element of Evolutionary Naturalism.
Emergent Evolution in Nature
The plan of nature which presents itself to the emergent
evolutionist is likened to a pyramid of tier-like oonstruction.
A process of creative organization leads at eaoh stage to the advent of gradients or levels above.

Each new level depended upon

the energies and conditions of the lower level and wes adjusted
to this wide-spreading foundation.

Matter, itself, was evolved.

Then came the earth with its waters, its salts and fertile earth,
and the sun giving it radiant energy.

Then, little by little,

came life reaching upward to more oomplex forms.

The story is a

long one, not oompletely deciphered, for whole chapters are missing in the records.

Slowly life lifted to mind, the human mind

being the latest and highest to appear.

Pre-history bave way to
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uman history; and society with its fruit, civilization,
ominate the surface of the earth.

~egan

to

Something of this sort seems

o be the unavoidable reading of the facts which science has colThe advantage of such a reading is that it explains the
·.7
o~existence in nature today of things so different as minerals
nd government, the stormy ocean and the human mind which contemplates it and sees in it beauty and destruction •

•

The evolutionary theses, in other words, would hold that
things of different orders behave differently and that the laws
hich formulate thi s behavior are not deducible from one another.
This conclusion is frequently expressed by saying that the laws
of nature form a hierarchy in which the different levels are discontinuous.

This logical, or deductive, continuity, does not

conflict with the genetic continuity of orders 0# things in
nature.

But it means that there are 'junctures' in nature at

which critical arrangements occur with the origination of novel
properties.' Genetic continuity is not
were.

What nature does we must accept.

of discovery.

smoot~

but mutative, as it

Knowledge is an affair

For this attitude, S. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan,

two very able English thinkers, have an attractive phrase.

We

must, they say, accept these mutative junctures with 'natural
Piety,.l
Evolutionary Naturalism
Sellars rejects the tradi4itional explanations of evolution, the various

f~ms

01 vitalism, final causality, the dif-
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ferent dualistic

p~tulates,

because they emphasize

exte~nal

fi-

nality or teleological interaction in nature and refuse to admit
that the different physical systems, that ls, inorganic matter
and the different levels of organiC matter from the plant to man,
~

contain

own trends.

thel~

Furthermore, he says that the "assump-

tion underlying these different explantaions has no justification
for the theory of originative evolution,
calls his own

p~ition

For this reason he

Evolutionary Naturalism. " But juat

~hat

precisely is meant by that title as contrasted with the rejected
theories is not made sufficiently clear.

The best characteriz-

ation of Sellar's naturalism is Ward's creative evolution minus
its spiritual element.

Consistency would demand that such a sys-

tem be mechanistic and purely materialistic but here, perhaps,
natural piety intervenes and enables the naturalist to cling to
evolutionary naturalism.
The Nature and Place of Man
In this pyramid of tier-like construction man emerges,
just a stage

bene~ththe

peak, as a very highly developed organ-

ism with a complex nature and a variety of functions, a new level
of behavior.

The distinctive qualities of this level are mind

and self-conaciousness.
Kind is the relatively permanent organization of habits
and tendencies which enables the animal to react as a whole to
the stimuli and to adjust itself intelligently.

Mind is something which grows and d~veloPs with the organism. 2

I
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Consciousness, the second distinctive quality of Uhis new
level of behavior, is a function of attention, stimuli and associations.

It is a continually changing stream.

consciousness is guidance.

The function of

It presents to the mind a sort of
~

survey when the brain-mind is seeking to adjust itself, or to
solve a problem. 3
Thus, according to this view, tn\higher act1vities of
man, 1ntellection, discriminative choice and aesthetic apprecition are taken to be adequately explained by the complexity and
high degree of development of the organism.
of faculties or powers as such.

We find no mention

The self is a very complex kind

of reality.

It is an organized system of hab1ts, information,
aims and sentlments. 4 Let this suff1ce for the view of man as he

is in himself and let us turn our attention to the problem of
freedom.
The New Setting of the Problem of Freedom
The problem of free will receives much the same treatment
from Sellars that the other problems received.

Considerable

space 1s given to the rejection of other doctrines but little is
said as to a thorough solution of the problem.
free will has been oleared up in

m~y

The question of

respeots in the years of

oontroversy which have raged around it.

The setting of the .de-

bate has shifted from the question predest1nation to the present
problem of the indiv1dual's freedom from nature.

This modern

shift 1n the staae of the question is due, in large part, to an
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awakening to the impossibility of the naked-soul conceptfon of
personality and self-hood.

We must not think of our wills as

being free but as ourselves as being free.

For what are we?

concrete persons who are agrowths in nature at the social level.
Each individual is a distinct growth from the roots of heredity
and environment.

Yet in appealing to these roots we must be

careful not to deny the fact of our sense of internal choice and
;"

valuations.
~

Sellars deprecate. the descrition of self

~

a pro-

I

for simply to say that the self is a product suggests that

it is a sort of impersonal and mechanical resultant of certain
forces and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon which contains
a helpless spectator who teels himself carried on down the stream
of events.

Even to speak of the self as a growth is apt to be

misleading, for the conscious self is again

imagi~ed

tator rather than as a participant in the growth.

as a spec-

The point to

realize is that an individual is his personality and that his
. will, desires and values are intrinSic to that personality.

The

relation of this self, ar personality, to heredity, the individual's freedom from nature, is evidenced by the rebellion against
heredity whiCh at times arises within us.

For when we rebel

against heredity, that means that we wish that we had better capacities and, perhaps, better health.

When we rebel against en-

vironment, that means that we wish that we had had better opportunities.

And both wishes are at once natural and futile.

are up against what is called our specific fates.

We

Hut such ape-
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cific fate does not rob us of our capacity to select and·'creat.
along the lines of possibillty which our nature and circumstances
indlcated.

It is I who choose to do this rather than that.

choQSe It because I desire It aDd believe it desirable.

I

only ex-

··..'7

ternal constraint can rob me of this active and courageous cholce
which gives zest to my life.

My conscious self is not somethlng

which merely wl tnesses the play of phys\cal
in a deeam.
choice.

~d

organiC forces as'

Instead, it is felt as a very centre and focus of

And I believe that this ,feeling is valid.

thing intensely and do my best to get it.

I want some-

5

Freedom and Responslbilltl
In studying the questions of freedom and responsibility we
must be careful, Sellars says, forst to free them from their theo
A soul was thought ot as a naked reality ha.lng

logical setting.
an innate power of

dec~s10n,

or faculty of Will, and g1fted

the knowledge of right and wrong.
responsible.

If 1 t freely"

wl~

Because of these gifts, It was

that is, w1 thout compulsion trom

wlthout, chose what was wrong it committed a sin and must exspect
to be punished by 1ts creator. But such a solution is too abstrac
and artific1al.

For,once more, what Is'the will; what is the

nature ot a moral judgment?

Is there any assured knowledge ot

right and wrong as comnands ot a sovereign master?

These are the

questions which Sellars puts to this "schematic and legaliatic"
view.

The answers which he himself gives to these questions w1ll

throw some light on his doctrine ot human freedom.

I
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The reply to the first question is that the will

~s

a

function of a developing complex of instinct and experience. 6
The second question is treated at length in the discussion
of the nature of a moral situation.

A moral situation is one in
;7

which matters of importance as regards ourselves and others are
up for decision.

As a rule, a moral question does not arise over

mere technical questions of the best means, from the standpoint

•

of intelligence and efficiency, to accomplish a desired end, but,
is rather concerned about the human effects and relations of
those means and ends.

The individual is confronted with a situ-

ation in which the choice whiCh might be made has good effects
and bad, reasons for making it and not making it.

It is up to

the individual to think the situation through and evaluate the
possible acts which he might posit in this situation.

Unlike a

purely intellectual judgment, the moral judgment is directly connected with choice and possible action.

--

In making a choice, what

are called ',self-assertive' or 'determining' tendencies are at
work.

And these tendencies are a part of the self which, how-

ever, is larger and more inclusive than they, taken separately.
At certain times some tendencies are more powerful in us than at
others.

We may be ambitious at one time and inclined to leisure

and pleasure at another, sensitive to the presence of people of
the other sex

o~

ror a time distinctly ascetic.

But, at any mo-

ment of choice, the self is a fairly dynamic and selective centre
of being.
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Sellars' meaning in

~wove

statement he makes concerning
ation of choice.

~e

is further clarified

r.n

a

place and effect of delibera

If we could knOIY exactly the si tuation confron-

ting an individual, that is, hlsvaJ.uations, desires, his cour.c"',

age, we could foretell hi s conduct.
he general line of it.

Or at least we could predict

For these psychic dispositions are the

actual data of his own decision; and as soop as these became
7
'
stable in deliberation, the choice would be fixed. The relative
or.ce of these assertive and determining tendencies, then, toether with the peculiar disposition which happens to be upon the
individual at the time are the determinants of choice.
Sense of

~land

Responsibilitl

This question ot moralludgment necess itates the study of
the sense of du ty and 'ought' together with the question of responsibility.

This. organized, integrated, more or less social-

ized self - while always moreorless fluid - has a momentum and
implications which our

intel11~enee

sires which spring up now and tben.

shows us is opposed to deThe sense of 'ought not' is

the feeling which accompanies this conflict in which the organized self senses its incompat1b1l1 ty wi th a desire.

This sense

of ought is the basis ot the lIloral categories which are inevitable, Sellars says, to such a real self with choice and valuation intrins1e to its very nature.
lysis of the sense of duty.

Here, then, we have his ana-
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Now let us apply this analysis to the question

o~'

respon-

A person is held to be responsible if he has the capa-

sibi~ity.

cities and is controlled by the motives which are characteristio
of society.

It means that he is a oertain kind of person, one
;7

fi t to be a memeber of society, one who"appreoitLtes human relations.

And suCh a person is one who is regarded as (1) oon-

.

trolled by sooial sanctions such as public opinion and fear of
punishment, and (2) has moral insight and makes personal ohoioes
in accordanoe with the welfare of himself and others.

only suCh

a person should be aocredited as a genuine member of society.8
If his actions confliot wi th the judgment ot sooiety he will be
punished.

According to what Sellar. maintains, then, responsi-

b11ity simply means that the 1ndividual has been born with selfasserting and determining tendencies which move him to aot 1n accord w1th the laws and customs ot society or at least are amenable to correction and adaptable to change when they are found to
be v101ating the laws of soc1ety.

Sellars concedes a personal

corrective power; but as to its ult1mate source in the 1ndiv1dual
he says nothing.
Fate or Freedom
In the same way does Sellars treat human behavior in the
vexing question ot fate and its bearing on the problem ot human
freedom.
p~t

He proposes the tollowing objection whiCh is trequently

to the professor by the student.
"It I am a product ot my heredity and environment,
how can I be held responsible for my actions?"

His answer, again and yet again, is that the point to

rea~~ze

is

that an individual is his personality and that his will, desires
and val ues are intinsic to that personality.
"Why cannot I be held free? Take me at any moment
and I am free in so far as I can carry out my plans.
And I am responsible for my actions if the;y .. are my
actions and chosen by me. In ~act, that, as we have
tried to Show, is all that responsibility means." 8.
But just what part does the will play in all of this? Assertions
are made but no explanations are given •

..

Sellars answers the third question by saying that we come
to a knowledge of right and wrong through experience in which we
gradually come to evaluate things for ourselves and become acquainted with the demands and prohibitions of society.
all the product of evolution.

This is

Laws come from within nature and

are not imposed upon it from without.
Summary
Thus does Sellars present his views on human freedom.
Spiritual powers are rejected, on the one hand as being unnecessary and, on the other, as being mere fictions introduced
satisfy the theological bias of certain philosophers.

to

Further-

mare, matter,considered as the sole primary element in the process of emergent evolution, is regarded as the ultimate squrce,
not only of all beings, but of their proper activltie. as well.
The doctrine which follows upon such presuppcs itions appears to
be an effort to explain human freedom without a free human agent.
For the source of all activity such as choice and power of control is said to be the highly developed bit of protoplasm known
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as man.

All that is said could, with but a few exceptiotis, be

said of the brute beast.

For the freedom spoken of is nothing

more than spontaneity and the possibIlity of variety in action.
Trends and impulses are supplied in the place of free will with
~

the result that responsibility is made impossible.

It must be

said that there is no real internal freedom of the will in this
doctrine, and the best that can be said.for it is that it is a
very weak form of psychological determinism.
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CHAPTER V

SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF' FREE WILL·

In studying the doctrine of free will presented by Scholastic Philosophers we shall proceed in» manner somewhat different from that of the authors we have just seen.

OUr exposition,

in this case, will begin with a definition of the

te~

with a

view to determining at the very beginnirlg just what we are talking about; with a view to understanding thoroughly the explanations and arguments proposed.

Freedom in general is the immunity

of an genD from some restraining influence.

And of this there

are three kinds, freedom from external coaction, freedan from necessity and freedom from obligation.

Freedom from external co-

action, or freedom of spontaneous action as it is also called,
means that the action of the agent is not the result of external
phYllical force and that the natural movment of the agent is not'"
impede by an opposing physical agency.

Thus the lion in the

jungle is free to roam where he chooses while the caged lion is
deprived, to a grea.t extent, of such freed:> m.

Freedom of inde-

pendence or freedom from obligation, is the immunity of an agent
from the moral obligation

imp~ed

by a lawtul suprerior.

In the

strictest sense of the word this freedom is found on1y in God,
the source of all lawful authority.

In a wider sense this free-

dom is enjoyed by men in those acts which are neither commanded
nor forbidden-by human or divine law.
and independent.

In such acts man is free
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Analysis ot Freedom ot Ohoice

Freedomot choice, treedom in the strictest sense ot the
term, is the central subject ot our controversy.

This freedom

not only involves the immunity of an ag9nt from external coaction, but the absence of that necessity which governs the activity of all material beings, whether they be inorganic matter,
living organisms, or even sensitive beidgs as such.

All these

beings are governed in their operations by necessity, that is,
lett to themselves, they must act as they do and cannot act
otherwise.

The work of the bird in building its nest and the

work of the bee in its hive is governed by necessity as is the
ebb and flow of the tide.

Without this necessity the natural

sciences would lack their basic principle, that is, unifDrmity
of nature.

The necessity, then, which governs these agents ;

arises from within their nature.

•

The sensitive appetite of both brute and man, guided as it
is by mere sense knowledge, is restricted to the sphere ot sensible and material good.

This limited range is the result of the

nature of the sensitive faculties.

These powers can know and act

only upon the concrete individual objects perceived by means of
sensible qualities.

But the rational appetite or will, guided

by the intellect, is not so limited and can extend to things of
a higher and the highest order.

Because of the higher nature of

these faculties they are not restricted to the sphere of sensible
objects but can know and act upon immaterial things, abstpact

I

48.

concepts, the moral good, the heroic and the sublime.

C~se

quently there is only one limitation set to the activity of man's
will; it can only strive after what is good.

Man never has a mo-

tiveless· volition and everything he chooses has something good in
it for him, albeit in some instances oul of proportion to the
evil accompanying it.

The range, then, of man's rational stri-.

.

ving is as wide as the range of the transcendental note 'good' •
A definition of freedom of choice as stated by Gruender is
.that endONment in virtue of which an agent, when
all the conditions requisite fer the performance
of an action are given, can perform the action or
abstain from it, can pertorm this action or that' 1
This is nothing but a concise expression of what we know from our
own experience, that our will possesses personal dominion over
itself in so far as it can actively determine its own line of
action.

And this dominion is known as active indifference.
Freedom of the Other Faculties
Here it will be well to clear up some possible misunder-

standings.

There is only one human faculty far which freedom of

choice is claimed, namely the rational appetite or will.

All

other faculties of man, cognitive and appetitive, are not free.
In the presence of their proper objects and all the conditions
requ1si te for the act they function necessarily unle.ss the will
intervenes to redirect their activity.

Thus the freedom and con-

trol which the other powers seem to have is not their own, but 'is
their response to the power ot the will which controls them.
'A thing is said to move in two waysJ First, as
an end; for instance, when we say that the end
moves the agent. In this way ~he intellect moves
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the will, because the good understood is the ob- .'
ject of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what
alters moves what is altered, and what impels
moves what is impelled. In this way the w111
moves the intellect, and all the powers of the
soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because ~erever we have
order among a number of ac~ive powers, that
power whiCh regards the universal end moves the
pewers which regard particular ends •••••••
Now the object of the will is good and the end'
in general, and each poweria directed to some
suitable good proper to it, as sIght. 1s directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the
will as an agent move. all the powers of the
soul to the1r respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, wh1Ch are not
subject to our will." 2
The control at this h1gher faculty or appetite in man is
made manifest by the consciousness of struggle which we experience at times, when for reasons apprehended by our intellect we
oppose the promptings of our lower appetency. st. Paul g1ves
classical expression to this struggle when he says,
'aut I see another law in my members, fighting
against the law of my mind, and captivating me in
the law of sin, that is in my members. Unhappy
man that I am who shall deliver me from the body
of thia death?"
Oond1tions for Free Ohoice
Another point that must be cleared up here is the extent
of

this freedom of the will.

claimed to be free.

Not every act of the wUl is

The claim for freedom is this.

When all the

conditions for a free volition are given, our will is endowed
with the power to elicit the act or abstain from it, to choose
among various objects intellectually apprehended as good.

The
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first of these conditions for free choice is the state
sciousness or attention.
are doing.

o~

con-

That is, we must be aware of what we

Thus when we are asleep or half asleep or in a state

of drowsiness there is not that awareness of the act requisite
for a fully free choice.

~

In the same way when.we are distracted

or engrossed in thought we are not fully conscious of our external actions and therefore cannot be

8ai~

to have the same freedom

that we have when we give those acts our full attention..

Conse-

quently, when we become aware of What we are doing is such a
state we frequently repudiate the act.

This immediate repudiatim

shows that we did not del1berately choose the first course of
action, that we did not have full knowledge of what we were dOing
and therefore were not free.
The second and more important condition far free choice is
1ntellectual deliberation, that is, weighing the motives intellectually apprehended.

•

Every free volition must be preeeded by a

judgment of the comparative goodness of the various objects of
choice.

Such a judgment is known as the objectively indifferent

judgment.
Consideration of the Motives

An objectively indifferent judgment is one in which the
reasons

f~

and against a definite line of action are proposed

and recognized.

In such a judgment the object is propesed as de-

sirable on the one hand and not necessary on the other.
are really two judgments invoved in it.

There

The one proposes the
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motives for striving for the object, while the other

pr~oses

the

motives for rejecting the object which has been intellectually
apprehended as good.

In treating of this matter we must ever

keep in mind that every judgment of ours in regard to finite good
is always, at least virtually and implicitly, dual in charaoter,
expressing motives for

and against its choice.

No finite good

brings unmixed bliss to me; every finite. good has some evil connected with it, be it ever so little.

Virtue is attractive, but

I am also aware of the difficulty of self-control and the demands
of saorifice.

Illicit pleasures are very attractive, but there

is also the knowledge of the wages of sin.

These of course are

the extremes but every deliberate consideration of cboice will
find ita place somewhere between the two.

Thus it is that man,

by means of his intellect, is able to study every aspect of a
situation and can find in it reasons for and against a certain
course of action.

It is, then, in this intellectual faculty with

its power of weighing the relative merits and demerits of the object proposed that we find the root of freedom. 3
Active Indifference
The next question whiCh presents itself for consideration
is that of active indifference.

Indifference is oppa:. ed to de-

termination; active is opposed to passive.

Indifference when

predicated of the will may denote that dispostion which is called
,pathy and is that property in virtue of which the faculty is not
determined to strive after a certain object in particular.

It
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might be said here that other faculties are thought to

b~'

endowed

with this power since they are not determined to one line of action.

But the peculiar indifference of the will is expressed and

qualified by the term active.

.

The will is actively indifferent

while all the other faculties are

.,

~ssively

indifferent.

The

other faculties are determined to a particular line of action by
a cause from without.

The peculiar

sti~lus

which acts upon the

senses at any moment determined the line of action of the senses.
But the free will determines itself.

\Vhen various conflicting

otives solicit the will in various directions the will itself
can determine its own attitude towards the motives intellectually
apprehended.

It can choose or refuse to accept pleasure, it can

choose or refuse to do its duty, whatever the circumstances of
the case W opaae.

The determination, then, to a particular line

of action originates in the will and hence its indiffereneeis
called active.
In all that has been said so far the one object was to
show what was meant by free will.

But what are the arguments

that can be brought forward for the doctrine of free will?
are three arguments which we shall now consider.

There

The first is an

argument from our own experience in conscious deliberate acts.
The second is based on the need of free will for true morali t;y.
The third is based on the need of free will as a necessary complement to man's nature.
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Argument from Consciousness
From introspection I know for a fact that very often it is
in my power to choose among various actions which I have motives
to perform.

An example of an action toqthe performance of which

we attatch very little importance will serve as an example.
After having given, for instance, a few hours to study in
~

my room, I realize it would be good and desirable to interrupt my
work for a few moments.

I feel sure I shall feel better disposed

£or work again after a few moments' rest.

On the other hand, I

realize that this interruption of work is by no means necessary
for me, at least not at this precise moment.
off the interruption for a while longer.

I may easily put

~l1rthermore,

I realize

that this change, though desirable even at this moment, is not
only not necessary, but in a way very undesirable.

I am just

ready to jot down an argument which at least in its present fornt
may escape me if I divert my mind by an interruption.

As a mat-

ter of fact, all motives considered, I come to the conclusion
that it is preferable to postpone the interruption.
clearly all the prerequisites for free choice.

Here are

The comparative

desirability of two courses of action 1s clearly before me and I
am quIte conscious of their desirability and pay attention to it.
ile as a matter of fact the stronger of the two motives was
followed, it cannot be sa1d that this motive determined the
choice.

On the grounds of the same consideration I could have

also interrupted my study_

In that act and all such acts of the

54.
~ree

will it is impossible to predict with absolute certainty

jus t what is going to be Cb ne in given circumstances.

In such

acts there is an element strictly incalculable, namely, the free
choice of the will.
;~

Further evidence for the existence and function of free
~ill

can be found in the conduct of any Ie rson about to make a

.

great change in life or about to enter on an important enterprise •
In such matters people do not as a rule act impulsively but
give the subject much thought and consult others on it.

rath~

Now it

would be impossible for them to treat the matter in this way if
they were not endowed with freedom.
~ined

If they were always deter-

by the conditions around them and were not free, how could

they put off the decision until after due deliberation?

Secondly,

what use would there be in studying the situation if eventually
the choice did not lie with the individual but must cane as the
necessary result of attendant circumstances?

Evidently, then,

there is some power of determination within the individlal that
is conditioned and influenced by motives but in no way determined
by them.
Then, too, such a thing as self-reproach and kindred feelings would be absurd except we be free.

We may be sorry for

some thing which we could not help doing but we in no way reproach
ou.selves for it.

The difference in the two feelings is simply

that in the one we know that we were free and could have done
otherWise while in the other we dislike the result of the act but
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feel that there was nothing to be done about it.

In the 4 same way

we are sometimes disturbed by strong emotions and desires which
create a great disturbance within us abut at the same time we are
consoious of the fact that we need not oonsent to these feelings,
that we must not makd them our own by oonsenting to them. ,And
this is only possible 1n the event that we are possessed of a
power in virtue of which we are able to . withhold our assent and
oombat these feelings.

That is to say, the only adequate explan-

ation for these feelings and the only suffioient reason far their
existenoe is the presenoe within us of a power whloh:i. not dete
mined by these feelings but is free to oonsent to them or oombat
them.

And that power, we say, is free will.

Indeed, our own ex- ,

perience gives us no end of evidenoe for the existenoe of freedom
of the will.
Argument from Morali tl
The second argument for the freedom of will is the argument from morality.

One o'f the most important. characteristios of

man's superiority over the brute 1s his morality.

But if he has

not the power of self-determination or of tree will as we have
defined it then it is useless to talk of his morality.

And that

is to be the burden of the subsequent exposition.
Obligation is not a mere oonvent1onality, not a mere name,
but a reality.

Man

is really and truly ob11ged in conscience to

perform certain aotions and to avoid others.
supp08es that man 1s tree.

But this obligat10n

Therefore, man is free.

Everyone
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will admit that debtors must pay their bills, that the p4rties
entering on a bilateral contract must perform their parts ot the
agreement, that children should honor and respect their parents,
and that many other obligations arise from human relationships.
No matter how men may try to explain away obligations, they could
not reasonalby maintain that all such obligations are simply the
fictions of old-tashioned medieval
age.

mor~ists,

not true tor every

But, as we said above, all this supposes that man is free.

It man is not tree, he is necessitated in his actions, they are

beyond his control.

But it he be necessitated, of what good is

it to preach to him of obligation and responsibility?
just as well preach to a machine.

You might

And it is equally ineffective

to attempt to hold the validity of obligation in the face of psychological determinism as it is to hold it in the face of strict
mechanical determinism.

For in both cases the control required

for morality and obligation

1s lacking. 4

The Greater Seeming Good
The determinists attempt to hold the validity of obligatio
and morality along with their doctrine by saying that the will
always follows the greater seeming good.
prove nothing against free will.

But in saying this 'they

The "greater seeming good" may

stand for anyone of the following; the more pleasurable; the more
rational gaod; what is

mo~e

in keeping with our habitual inclin-

ation; what is more in accord with our present actual inclination
( and this latter embraces two possibilities ); what is more in
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accord with our present actual indeliberate inclination;

~hat

is

more in accord with our present actual deliberate inclination.
Now in all meanings of the term except the last, the statement of
the will's submission to the "greater seeming good" is false because it is contradicted by experience.

Experience proves that

all men are not epicurians; that all men are not saints; that
many a sinner has reformed and many a hero
... haa fallen; that men
~ight

Valiantly and successfully against

IUs consider the last meaning of the term:
~ord

temptatio~

"Men always act in ac,-

with their actual deliberate inclination".

~lways

~ncline

will be true.

But now let

This 1s true and

It simply means that men always actually

towards that towards which they actually incline. And

~hat

is the same as say1ng that that mot1ve prevails which the

~ill

makes to prevail.
Now the greatest fault in the statement we are considering

is its un1versa11ty.

It 1s true that we sometimes, perhaps

ofte~

follow the greater seeming good in the sense that we follow the
line of least resistance, whatever that happens to be.
~he

point to be stressed here is that even While following the

~reater
~o

However,

attraction we frequently realize most clearly that we do

as a resu1t of our own free choice, fully aware that we can

phange our resulution without any change in thepperception of the
~reater

seeming good.

Furthermore, if we did not have the power

of free choice we should be unable to act at all in those instan~es

where the motives for and against an act, or the motives for
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an7 one of a number of possible acts were all equally

s~ong.

or in suCh an instance there would be no greater seeming good.
owever, experience teaches us that this is not the case and that
e can and do act in such circumstances.

The theory of the

"greater seeming good" is only true when understood as the practical judgment which precedes the execution of the choice but
hich is made consequent upon the choice... of the will. 5
Effect of Environment on Action
Another favorite claim of the determinist is that men are
the result of their environment.

Again, the fault lies in making

he statement universal in reference to men's actions.

Experience

be called upon again to show that this statement is false.
istory gives us any number of instances of good men coming from
a bad environment and bad men coming from a good environment.

At

the same time it is true that our environment does have some influence on us.

But our environment only influences us, it does

not determine' us.

It is also true that there are individuals who

are strongly influenced by their environment, who would be good
if good influences were brought to bear upon them and bad if bad
unfluences were brought to bear upon them.

But this is not due

to the fact that they are not free but rather to the fact that,
not Choosing to exercise the freedom they have, they prefer to
act in accord with the people with whom they find themselves.
The present crisis in Spain shows clearly that more than environment enters into the determination of men's actions.

In the same
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location there are to be found Royalists, SocialistB

and~abid

APparently the environment was not the determining

~archists.

element of the choice of the individual members of these groups.
Furthermore, it is quite possible that some individuals had left
<7

one party and taken up the cause of one of the others without any
noticeable change in the environment.

It is clear, then, that

the environment does little more than irfluence the individual by
presenting motives for and against possible courses of action.
And it is the individual, whether in a favorable or unfaVorable
enVironment, that u1itmately determines his own course of action.
In this way alone can we account for the variety of political
parties, not only in Spain, but in practically every country in
the world.

Finally, the same freedom of choice which individuals

enjoy in choosing their political affiliations they likewise enjoy in every deliberate action and can therefore be held respon"

...

sible for it.
Necessary Complement of Man's Nature
Now let us proceed to the third and last proof of free
will which is based on the need of free will as the necessary
complement of man's nature.

OWing to his rational nature, man is

capable of objectively indifferent judgments, that is, of judgents which exhibit motives both for striving after and for rejecting any particular line of action.

But these objectively in-

different judgments are to no purpose unless man's rational appetency or will is actively indifferent, that is, unless his will
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is free.

Therefore, man's will is free.

The object of une will,

as was said above, is the good apprehended by the intellect.

In

so far as an object is presented to the will as good it is desirable, but 1n so far as 1 t is presented as evil 1t. is undesirable •
No

•7

there is only one object that moves whe will necessarily and

that is the object which is represented as good or desirable in
every respect.

There is only one object which fulfills tOls re•

•

quis1te and that is the Divine Essence, the Summum Bonum.

And it

must be noted, that in this life, due to imperfect knowledge,
concupiscence and the interference of his lower nature, man is
runable to apprehend God as the SUmmum Bonum.

So we can say that

in every instance of deliberation over choice there are motives
for acting and not acting.

Similarly, in the case of a desired

end man sees that there are various ways of attaining it; the
~eans

to the end is not restricted to one course of action.

Now

all of this would be futile in the event that man was not able to
rule his actions in the light of this knowledge but must follow
the course of action which his nature and circumstances

determin~

Not on11 would this knowledge be futile but also a source of misery instead of a source of happiness.

With this knowledge man

can determine his actions and use the means which will insure his
attainment of the end desired.

But if he be not free he must

follow, not what he knows to be the surest and best courae but
that course which the circumstances in the case determine.

He

would not be master of his fate, but, rather, the vi.tim of his
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fate.

Virtue and vice both in himself and others would "imply be

the peculiar fate of the individual, a fate whiCh cannot be
avoided or overcome.
~ires

Ideals would count for nothing and noble de-

would be meaningless tor they would be powerless in moving

the individual to action.

'"
Under such conditions
man would be not

the happiest of creatures but the most miserable. Evidently, a
~ature

endowed with a rational soul but.not freedom of choice is

a caricature.

In conclusion let us consider st. Thomas' teleo-

logical argument for the freedom of the will.
"Man has tree will; otherwise counsels, exhortations,
commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishment would
be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must
observe that some things act wothout judgment; as a
stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things
which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment,
but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the
sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be
shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment,
because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of
any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from
judgment, because by his apprehensive power he
judges that something should be avoided or sought.
But beoause this judgment, in the case of some
particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but
from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore
he acts from free judgment and retains the power
of being inclined to various things •. For reason in
contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as
we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent,
and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason
may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate
to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it neoessary that man have a free will. 6
Having completed our exposition of the traditional Scholastic doctrine of human freedom we may now turn our attention to
an analysis of the other doctrines treated in this thesis in the
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light c£ what we have just seen.

.'

Notes to Chapter V

1.

Hubert Gruender, S.J.,

2.

st. Thomas Aquinas,

Summa Theologica, first ~ rt,
question;782, article 4.

3.

st. Thomas Aquinas,

Summa Theologica, first part,
question 83, article 1.

4.

Michael Maher, S.J.,

5.

Joseph Froebes, S.J.,

6.

st. Thomas Aquinas,

Free Will,

Psychology,

til

p. 10.

p. 403.

Psychologia Sreculativa,
pp. 20 , 202.

vol. 2,

Summa Theologica,. first part,
question 83, first article.

.,...

64 .

.
'

CHAPTER VI

CRITICISM OF EVOLUTIONARY VIEWS
The philosophy of Evolution, at least in the instances
here being sbudied, denies the

exlsten~~

of a rational principle,

the soul, distinct from and essentially superior to matter.

Des-

pite the strong evidence of science to the contrary, despite the
incompatibility of identifying sp1rituat and material functions,
our worthy opponents insist upon saying that life, ( and even
more than that, intellection ) have matter as their ultimate
source.

The consequences of such a tenet are evidently false. l
The authors agree that the peculiar control found in man

is due to his intellectual

p~ler

of abstraction and relation; in

other words, to man's ability to conceive ends as ends and tne
relation of means to end.

At the same time they are unaware of

what was pointed out above, that without free will this
tual power is useless and

~urtful.

intelle~

In each instance the intel-

lect is regarded as determining the will.

The will, on the evi-

dence of the mind, comes to know the strongest motive and is then
moved to act upon this motive.

The freedom of such an act lies

in the fact that the agent is not moved by a physical force determining it in 1ts act from without.

The individual determines

the acts but in accord with that which has the strongest appeal
at the moment.

But this is no more that the freedom of spontane-

ity which even tne animal has when not confined.

The indifferenc

lies in the fact that the individual is not determined to act the

I

os. ..
same way in every instance.

But since this indifference l.s due

fact that the subjective state varies from time to time,
d to this fact alone, it is not active but only passive indif-

Effec~

...

of Knowledge on Will

Engels makes clear knowledge the determinant of the will;

•

knowledge is also the source of freedom; in ignorance the
ill must make an arbitrary choice and is not free.
isconcept1on of freedom.

This is a

Knowledge enables the will to act fre&-

y by reason of the fact that it presents many courses of action
d the reasons for and against each action.

But the power' of

ree choice is in the will itself and nat in knowledge.

Ignor-

nee, partioularly if it is inculpable, oan make certain unforeen and unintended effects of a free action involuntary.2 Knowedge does influence freedom but does not control or

overwhe~

•

its choice. Engels here confuses the condition of the
choice with the cause of the choice.

He neglects the cause en-

tirely and make. the condition the cause.

Furthermore, Engels in

ractice is not consisten with his theory.
ains that the will is not free.

In theory he main-

But in his gospel of revolution

e implies and internal power that is free to initiate and carry
through to completion the various processes that will bring about
the economio emanCipation of the hUman race.

Here it is well to

ote that Engels, as well as every other communist, dare not adit the freedan of the will.

For to do that would be an admis-

I

sion that men can freely determine economic conditions

~

would

thus destroy the inevitability of a world revolution founded on
universal determinism.

To admit free will would also be an admis

sion of the fact that men can combat the evil and hostile ele~ents

of their environment, as the Catholics actually' do in Mexi-

co today.

In brief, to admit the existence of free will is to

destroy the very foundations of Communism.

•

Therefore, despite

the fact that it contradicts What we know to be true, it must be
maintained that there is no 'suCh thing as human freedom based on
man's power of free choice.
Ward and Sellars make the intellect a motive inasmuch as
they consider it as one phase of the moving self.

Just as emo-

tions and desires are the moving of the self towards or away from
an object, so intellection is a moving of the self towards or
away from an object.

And just as the stronger emotion prevails

so the greater knowledge, that is, of reasons for or against the
choice, together with their emotional concomitants, prevails.

In-

tellection, then, becomes just another determining element in an
act which the authors call free but which we would call

impulsiv~

And impulsive it is, because feeling and impulse, not intellectual knowledge together with the choice of the will, determine
the act.
The Nature

or

a Faculty

The authars take the above view of knowledge because they
insist on regarding man as a unit and all his acts as the work-

67.

ings or this unit.

Thus they repudiate the faculty expldnation

because it represents man as being made up, let us say, of a number of little machines each having its proper function and acting
independently of the others.

Mental faculties, as we explain
07

them, are imagined by the adversariea as peculiar organizations
1n the soul similar to the physical organs in the body; and they
fail to regard the faculties, and the w\ll in particular, as
peculiar modes of activity abiding permanently in the soul. 3 They
wish to explain faculties as nothing more than the response of
the individual to various ,stimuli, and to account for the power
to make these responses by the adaptability of the nature of the
individual only.

They maintain that we can only classify the

different acts and cannot conclude from them to any definite disposition in the soul as their source.

There are only functions

which man in his development by trial and error has learned to
perform; and through the frequent repetition of these functions
men have achieved a certain facility in their performance.

As

this facility of performance increased, men became more disposed
to perform these acts when the occasion called for them.

Choice,

then, becomes nothing more than a peculiar response of the individual's whole nature to a situation.

For that reason they main-

tain that it is incorrect to say that the will chooses, while,
as a matter of fact, it is the man who chooses.
The explanation just treated above makes man a mere spectator of the actions which he performs.

He has a part in them it
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is true but his part consists in following the direction .,pointed
out by the determining factors of the moment.

Accordingly, the

simple act of choice presents in the psychic realm a phenomenon
very much like that of the parallelogram of forces in the physica
realm.

"

.....

Forces conflicting with one another are at work and the

stronger force prevails.

When the individual chooses he is moved

to make the choice by the stronger motive.' But as we have seen

•

above, the stronger force, a temptation. for example, does not
always prevail but ,is combated by another force which is influenced but not determined by it.

Furthermore, the opposition set

p against the temptation is prompted by a physically and psychioally weaker element, that is, knowledge.
the temptation is bad, opposes it.

The will, knOwing that

Furthermore, in confliot we

are aware, not of two forces acting within us and pulling us in
different directions, but rather of a force within us whih we actively combat of our own accord.

The struggle is internal, but

the self takes one side of it.
The Basis of Morality and Responsibility
The explanation of the determinists given above, besides
contradioting what we know from our own experience, destroys the
very foundation of morality and responsibility.

In these latter

the important element is the knowledge of right and wrong together with the power to act with the guidance of this knowledge
against strong

opposing forces.

But this knowledge in itself is

not a force but a mere presentation of facts and influences the
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will by reason of tne fact that it presents desirable ob!ects to
it.

Emotions and desires are the spontaneous response of the in-

dividual to desirable 06jects.

It is true that there are associ-

ated with knowledge definite emotions.

Through this association

knowledge has a fruther influence on the will.

But in the deter-

minists' explanation it would be not the knowledge but the concomitant emotions which would point out ;.the course which the will
should follow.

Furthermore, unless the will was endowed with the

power of choosing its own course of action it would be forced to
follow the dictates of the emotions and desires which were associ~ith

the knowledge.

In th1s view the elements of determination

I'become, first, the spontaneous emotions or reactions of the individual accompanying the perception of the good, and second, the
emotions that accompany the knowledge of the object, that knowledge which the individual attains through reflection and a consideration of the object.

In suCh a situation the determining

element will be the stronger emotion.

And unless there is a pow-

er which is capable of acting against this emotion when ·it is
known to represent the less desirable aspect of the object, as
far example in sin, the individual must follow it.

In such a

situation the individual, knowing what is right, is unable to
follow this knowledge because the stronger forces of his being
are against it.

Fir thermore, he could only do what he knows to

be right when his emotions and desires are in accord with his
knowledge or when there is aS80ciated with this knowledge an

~O.

emotional force strong enough to overcome the emotional

~orces

opposed to this knowledge.

Thus man would choose what he does

because he must choose it.

Consequently, conformity to the moral

law would be beyond his own power.

And for the same reason he
47

could not be held responsible for what he did because he simply
~ad

to do it.
Experience, however, gives us ev\denCe that the actual

situation is diffel'ent from that presented by the determinists •.
when,for instance, while performing an action or harboring a bad
thought indeliberately we immediately stop the action or dispell
the thought on becoming aware of what we are doing.
~tance

~ut

In one in-

we follow the spontaneous trend of the mind and impulse,

in the other we actively modify both the thought and the

action.

We could not do this if we did not have freedom of will.

Such events certainly show that we have direct control over our
actions and that in deliberate acts there is a force at work that
is independent of the other powers of our being.
In the light of determinism it would be cruel to hold an
individual to the observanc.e of the moral law and punish him if
~e

did not observe it.

Each individual, if determinism would be

consistent, would know no law nor be capable of observing any law
save the law of his own peculiar character.
~ope

Society could not

to correct recalcitrant individuals and could only protect

itself by segregating them and thus making it impossible for them
to harm SOCiety.

It is very difficult to see just how education

could effect a Change in criminals.

PuShing determinism·to its

logical conclusion we see that society would not be made up of
individuals subject to law but-of individuals subject to no law •.
Determinism and Radical Conversions
47

In the same way the determinists are at a loss to explain
the fact of sudden and radical conversions either from a bad life
to a good life or vice versa.

The firs\ gives compelling evi-

dence of a power capable of acting against the habits and inclinations of the past, which, they all agree, are important elements in the making of character.

For in such a conversion the

individual turns, not only against his environment, but also
against the ingrained habits and dispositions of his whole past·
life.

The second shows that ingrained habits and tendencies

alone are not strong enough to keep a person on the path of virtue but may break down and give way to ether tendencies in the
face of a great crisis or temptation.

In the light of determin-

ism a saint should be a saint far all time and the sinner a slnner forever.
It is not to our purpose here to discuss the question of
the origin and nature of the moral law.

We might just note here

that the authors we have treabed maintain that the moral law develops with the advance of society.

As man grows in knowledge of

imself and the world about him, he comes to see what is helpful
to him and what is hurtful.

On the basis of this knowledge the

moral law is built up and maintained.

This law, however,

embrac~
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nly the social aspect of man's life.

Though it is not

~pressly

stated, still, we can conclude from what is said that man is only
ilty of wrong-doing when he performs an act that is harmfUl to
Personal sin, an offence against God to Whom the. indiq

in complete submission, is neither mentioned nor conA man can do what he likes with himself and in his prias long as his actions do not pave an evil effect on
Of course, were there such a thing as personal sin recthe determinist he would be confronted with the same
ifficulty of responsibility as pointed out above.
Conclusion
As a conclusion to this discussion it can with certainty
e said that the doctrine of determinism in rejecting the freedom
active indifference destroys morality and responsibility and
man a brother of the brute.

The nobility of the vir'

as well as the meanness of the evil life is destroyed.
become, not what he would have himself to be, but
hat his nature and environment determine him to be.
hese are unhappy conclusions.

Surely,

It is well that our own experi-

nce teaches us that they are false.

.
'
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CONCLUSION

Dr. Samuel Johnson has said,
"All theory is against freedom of the will,
all practice far it."
The three non-scholastic philosophers ~~ have studied seem to
bear out the truth of Johnson's statement.

In theory, each of

these men attempted to show that the will is not possessed of the
freedom of active indifference.

At the·same time they implied,

in their applications of theory to practice that there must be
freedom of will.

It is interesting to note the attitude of mind

which dominated these men in their speculations and brought them
to conclusions which, no doubt, they would be unwilling to maintain if they once realized the fatalism and pessimism that necessarily flows from them.
Scientific Attitude of PhilOSOPhers
Each of thewe writers, in
guments of the philosophy

~

d~scussing

and refuting the ar-

the schoolmen, showa clearly that he

understands neither the doctrines nor the spirit of this philosophy.

Undoubtedly their main objection against this traditional

philosophy would be that it is not scientific.

To set down gen-

eral prinCiples and propositions from which. the particular instance ia explained is, in their narrowly empirical understanding of science, a procedure just the reverse to that of science.
Evidently they do not realize that the general statement followed
upon the study of particular instances.

At the same time these
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men are not aware that they themselves are anything but A'cientif'ic in their methods and procedure.

They fail to sense the defect

of their own methods and overlook the fact that they may not be
open-minded in appraising the methods of others.

This is a fair

...,

indictment of their own spirit for from the attitude which each
has assumed towards the teachings of others, it seems clear that
they were more ready to repudia te
stand them.

This

fac~

o~er .doctrines

than to under-

appears in the frequent misstatements of'

the doctrines and meaning of terms as presented by scholastic
philosophers.

Having interpreted them in their own way they re-

ject them as untrue and unreasonable.

At the same time these men

accept theories and propase solutions to problems which demand
more faith than reason, which fitted fancies better than they
ted the tacts.
tion.

fi~

To mention only one of these, let us take evolu-

Darwin, the father of the modern development of the idea

of organic evolution, in proposing this theory did

not intend
that it should be taken as an absolute and demonstrated fact. l It
was for him just a theory, a purely speculative consideration,
suggested by the gradations in nature which seemed to proceed one
from another, and the correspondence of the organs and functions
of one level with another.

But here we have three men who take

the theory of evoultion as a basic dogma of reality and attempt
to build settled systems of philosophy upon it.

Whatever one

.ight term such a procedure, it is not scientific thus to turn
tenuous

hypothesi~

into iron-clad dogma.
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What Science Really Shows
A clever device used by these men in explaining away difficulties was to say that science had not progre8sed sufficiently
as yet to give a complete explanation Qt the problem at hand.
However, there was no doubt in their minds that the day would
come when all the necessary facts would be produced and evolution
together wi th all that follows from it ~ould be demonstrated.

U

fortunately for these men science has not lived up to their expectations.

Rather, science has shOwn that these theories are

untenable, and the more deeply thefluestions are delved into the
more evidence of this fact is brought forth. 2 Along with this
evidence there is coming to men of science today the realization
that there are many problems which science cannot approach.

Sur-

prising to note, the question of free will is one of these, and
many of the prominent scientists of today are not only realizin!
but even openly admitting that the question of free will is beyond the scope of the test tube. 3 It is however not beyond the
scope of introspection.
method.

And introspection is a true scientific

However, introspection is not to be classed with those

strictly mechanical methods of the physical sciences, the methods
referred to by the term .test tube' •. Would the authors, knowing
the decisions of modern scientists, still insist that a denial of
free will would be in accord with science?

77.

Free Will a Vital Power
Perhaps we could forgive the determinists if their doctrines concerned only theory and did not affect practical life.
or then they could hold to their
the worse off for the errors.

the~Jes,

and no one would be

But since free will holds so great

a place in the life of every individual, the determinist must be
ealt with severely as an enemy to the tndividual and society.
It would not, I think, be wrong to say that, after God, the most
important thing in the individual's life is his power d
choice.

free

Endowed with this power, man is the master of his fate.

and the ruler of his own life.

Without this power, he would be-

come a mere puppet that is ever moved about by the forces of nature within himself and about him.

With free will man has the

power to control the powers of his being, it is within his power
to do good and evil, to make of his life an example of virtue
an exhibition of vice.

o~

Because of this power of free will men

are held responsible for what they do, and can be trusted to exercise this power in respecting the persons and rights of others
and to live according to the dictates of right reason.
In the same way the power of freely following an object of
choice enables men to rise above the sordid environment in which
they sometimes find themselves and follow the guidance of their
igher nature in the way of virtue.

Ideals are efficacious in

the lives of individuals simply because man is not bound to follow the direction which his innate powers and environment point
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.'

out.

Everyone acknowledges the fact of free will when he lauds
the bravery of an individual who has overcome the fear that was

.

within him and went undaunted into the dangers that beset him
~

from without.

.,

Like witness is given when people look down upon

the coward who has followed the feelings that took hold of him
and fled when a dangerous situation confronted him.

A still

greater witness is to be found in any court or law where men are
called to account for their actions because they are free; where
they are exonerated if it can be shown that the violation of the
law was beyond their control.

Many other examples could be

brought forth showing that men have ever regarded their fellowmen as free beings having the power to control their actions.

In

fact, so strong is the evidence for the existence of free will
that it is nothing but common sense to admit its existence and
simply futile to deny it.

...

Even the great human progress which we

see going on about us constantly manifests the presence of free
will, for all such progress, scientifiC, economic, individual,
80cial, must be attributed ultimately to the power of man's free
will to choose the better pourae.
The Determinist's Sad World
On the other hand, a denial of free will begets a philosophy of fatalism and pessimism as a necessary consequence.

It

was a wise student who in consternation asked professor Sellars
why and how he could be held responsible for his actions if they
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were the result of his heredity and environment.

For tHis stu-

dent had caught the significance of the very point which impressed st. Thomas in his defense of the freedom of the will.
Both of them saw clearly that it would be strange and useless and
<7

unreasonable to urge people OD to the practice of virtue and exhort them to avoid vice if they haa not free wills.
Johnson maintains, the theory is not
cal experience.

s~nsistent

And as Dr.

with our practi-

For words of encouragement and assistance in

difficult matters would fallon deaf ears if there was not a power capable of overcoming difficulties and holding the struggler
to persevere to the end.

Ideals would be meaningless and a

source of misery instead of a spur to higher things if our inherited powers and environment determined our actions for us.
In brief, life would be worth living only for those who

were fortunate enough to receive a finer grade of powers when
heredity came round to distribute them.

These individuals could

look for happiness in a life of goodness and success.

But it

would be a narrowing and bitter form of goodness and success in
which they could Dot;:nelp their less fortunate brothers whose
powers did not permit them to do great things but chained them
irrevocably to the drab and unhappy life of mediocrity, failure,
and evil.

In the first class of individuals we should find the

paragons of virtue, find them there because heredity pre-ordained
that they ahould be there.

In the second class the sinner should

find his place and find it easily for heredity had selected and
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reserved it for him the day he was born.
this world if such were the case?
a world?

Who could be

~ppy

in

Who would want to live is such

No one who was worthy of the name, 'human being', not

even a determinist.

.

But that is what he should have to put up

with if what he said were true.

.,

Shakespeare's lago tells us that 'our bodies are gardens,
to which our wills are gardeners,

and it is in our power to

•

beautify these gardens with industry and good works or to let
them be over-run with weeds and brambles of idleness and evil
deeds.

Philosophers, scientists and litterateurs have in these

pages said the same thing in less figurative language.

All of

these men seemed to realize that the knowledge of this fact is
the lite-spring of hope and self-confidence in the face of great
problems and great crises, and that to believe that we had not
that great power of free will would rob life of all meaning and
destroy completely hope and self-confidence.

Though he try with

all his might, the determinist can never explain away free will,
for his own nature demands this freedom, and in daily life is
ever manifesting this great human power.
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